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Buying Promises: How Citizens United’s 
Campaign Expenditures Convert Our “Impartial” 
Judges and Their Nonpromissory Campaign 
Statements into an Indebted, Influenced, and 
Dependent Judiciary* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
[W]e cannot have even a baseball game without an impartial umpire to 
enforce the rules of the game and settle controversies that may arise 
between the players; and there can be no such thing as a peaceful 
society in the absence of an impartial judiciary to settle controversies 
on the basis of what is just and right and to direct the power of the state 
in the enforcement of law.1 
Imagine this scenario: You play for the Atlanta Braves, who are in 
the final game of the World Series against the Yankees.  The ballgame is 
tied in the top of the ninth with two outs, and when you step up to bat, 
you hit the ball into the stands right by the foul pole.  However, it is 
unclear to you whether the ball flew behind or in front of the pole.  The 
game, the championship, and possibly your career are riding on the home 
plate umpire’s call.  He calls it a foul.  The Yankees go on to win.  
Naturally, you would feel a great sense of disappointment but, 
nevertheless, know that the Yankees won it fair and square. 
Now, imagine that umpires were elected to their jobs and that during 
his “umpire campaign,” the home plate umpire made a campaign 
statement that he believed the American League was better than the 
National League.  As a result of this statement, a particular corporation 
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 1. John J. Parker, The Judicial Office in the United States, 23 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 225, 225 
(1948). 
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affiliated with the American League expended substantial sums of 
money on advertisements supporting the umpire candidate.  Now elected, 
he is umpiring the biggest game in baseball and feels a deep sense of 
gratitude towards the organization that supported him. 
The truth is, when your ball flew past the foul pole, the home plate 
umpire really had no clue which side of the pole it passed.  However, he 
felt pressured, indebted, and dependent on the corporation that 
essentially got him his job.  So instead of conferencing with the other 
umpires and carefully considering what should be done, he recklessly 
called the play in favor of the Yankees.  Now do you feel like the 
Yankees won it fair and square?  Of course not. 
As shocking as the above scenario seems, it is an accurate reflection 
of what has become of our elected judiciary.  Similar to an umpire’s duty 
to impartially call plays, the role of a judge is to impartially carry out the 
administration of justice.2  But this paramount duty has been lost in the 
politics that have so fiercely taken over our elected judiciary.  What 
began in the Jackson era—when the first judicial elections were held—as 
an attempt to ensure that judges were not agents of the legislature has 
snowballed into an unjust reality of our judges acting partially as agents 
of the electorate.3  This Comment asserts that judicial candidates’ ability 
to announce their views on disputed legal issues, coupled with 
unrestricted corporate spending in judicial elections, has completely 
destroyed the independence of our elected judiciary by allowing “special 
interests” to buy promises of partial decisions from a particular candidate 
if elected. 
Part II of this Comment will begin by exploring the evolution of 
judicial elections and their regulation.  Since 1924, opponents of judicial 
elections have been trying to minimize the risks that come with such 
elections through campaign regulations in codes of judicial conduct.4  
Among these regulations are provisions known as announce, commit, 
and pledges or promises clauses that restrict what judicial candidates can 
say during campaigns.5  Because judges must carry out their duties 
impartially, these campaign speech regulations aim to prevent judges 
from binding themselves to a particular disposition with regard to a  
                                                     
 2. Id. 
 3. See infra Part II.A. 
 4. Matthew J. Streb & Brian Frederick, Judicial Reform and the Future of Judicial Elections, 
in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS 204, 205–06 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007). 
 5. See infra Part II.B. 
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particular issue—in case the issue comes before them in the future if 
elected.6 
Next, Part II will explore the deterioration of these judicial campaign 
speech regulations.  In 2002, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 
the Supreme Court struck down Minnesota’s announce clause as 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.7  White’s holding sparked a 
trend among states that ultimately led some states to eliminate judicial 
campaign speech regulations altogether.8  This Comment will explore the 
Court’s holding and reasoning in White and then discuss how courts have 
struggled with White’s application to other campaign regulations such as 
the pledges or promises and commit clauses. 
Part II will conclude by discussing issues involved with campaign 
expenditures.  Specifically, this Comment will focus on the Court’s 
holding in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,9 requiring judges to recuse 
themselves when substantial funds were used by a litigant to place the 
judge on the bench, as well as the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. 
FEC.10  In Citizens United, the Supreme Court put the final nail in the 
coffin of an independent elected judiciary when it held that the First 
Amendment prohibited restrictions on corporate campaign 
expenditures.11  Permitting corporations to expend unrestricted sums 
from their treasury funds to ensure that a particular candidate is put on 
the bench, combined with the substantial deterioration of our judicial 
campaign speech regulations, eliminates what little independence 
remained in the elected judiciary. 
Part III of this Comment will begin by analyzing how elections have 
caused the judiciary to become partial.  Next, it will focus on the scope 
and constitutionality of additional judicial campaign speech regulations 
under the White framework.  Then, after hesitantly accepting the Court’s 
conclusion in White, Part III will establish that Citizens United and White 
cannot live together because substantial Citizens United campaign 
expenditures convert White’s nonpromissory campaign statements into 
implied promises between the candidate and the expending organization.  
Next, Part III will propose that the only way to maintain any impartiality 
for judges in states that utilize judicial elections is by either overturning 
White or narrowing the application of Citizens United by excluding 
                                                     
 6. See infra Part II.B. 
 7. 536 U.S. 765, 765. 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 10. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 11. Id. at 913. 
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judicial elections from its holding.  Finally, this Comment will conclude 
by suggesting that until the severance of White and Citizens United is 
accomplished—if ever—states should protect the impartiality of their 
judiciaries by increasing their recusal standards. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Evolution of Judicial Selection 
The politics inherent in the electoral process have steadily 
contaminated the independence of our elected judiciary.  There once was 
a time, however, when our impartial judges were not transformed into 
politicians.  States have not always elected their judges.12  Until the 
Jackson era, state judges were appointed.13  In some states, the legislature 
made the selections, and in other states, the governor made the 
selections.14  Then, in the mid-nineteenth century, the rise of Jacksonian 
democracy coincided with a shift to and rise of judicial elections.15  By 
the Civil War, a majority of states elected their judges.16 
The emergence of state judicial elections was primarily attributed to 
the desire for an independent judiciary.17  “[T]he legal profession . . . 
believed that, as an independent branch of government, the judiciary 
should not be an agent of the legislature”18 and would gain a degree of 
independence if provided with its own separate constituency.19  
However, almost as quickly as state judicial elections gained popularity, 
they also garnered criticism.20 
State judicial elections started off as partisan and, therefore, very 
much controlled by politics, which led to corruption.21  In 1906, Roscoe 
Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School at the time, spoke before the 
                                                     
 12. See Polly J. Price, Selection of State Court Judges, in STATE JUDICIARIES AND 
IMPARTIALITY: JUDGING THE JUDGES 9, 12–13 (Roger Clegg & James D. Miller eds., 1996). 
 13. See id. 
 14. CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 4 
(2009). 
 15. Id. at 5; Price, supra note 12, at 13. 
 16. Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, 64 JUDICATURE 
176, 176 (1980). 
 17. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 14, at 7. 
 18. Id. at 5, 7. 
 19. Id. at 5. 
 20. Price, supra note 12, at 14. 
 21. Matthew J. Streb, The Study of Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 4, at 
1, 9–10. 
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American Bar Association (ABA), disapproving of judicial elections.22  
An excerpt from Pound’s speech is often quoted to describe the views of 
those who advocated for the judicial appointment system’s return: 
“Putting courts into politics and compelling judges to become 
politicians . . . has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the 
bench.”23 
The dissatisfaction with partisan judicial elections sparked further 
judicial selection reform.24  The first reform was the emergence of 
nonpartisan judicial elections.25  Proponents of nonpartisan elections 
believed “partisanship had little to do with judging”26 and hoped the 
removal of candidates’ party affiliation from the ballot would eliminate 
the corruptness that had become entangled in judicial elections.27  The 
removal of party affiliation from the ballot, however, did not completely 
remove politics from judicial elections—the most obvious reason being 
that judicial candidates still had to campaign for office.28  Moreover, the 
removal of party affiliation resulted in lower voter turnout in judicial 
elections.29  Some worried the decrease in voting would cause close races 
to be determined by “special interests such as insurance companies, big 
business, labor unions or segments of the legal profession.”30  
Dissatisfaction with nonpartisan judicial elections grew almost as fast as 
it did with partisan elections.31 
Those still dissatisfied with judicial elections turned to further reform 
known as the “merit plan,” endorsed by the ABA in 1937.32  The merit 
plan—also known today as the “Missouri Plan”33—involves the governor 
initially appointing judges from a list of candidates put forth by a 
                                                     
 22. Price, supra note 12, at 14. 
 23. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 14 
AM. LAW. 445, 450 (1906); see CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE 
RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 5 (1997); Berkson, supra note 16, at 177; Price, 
supra note 12, at 14; Streb, supra note 21, at 10. 
 24. Streb, supra note 21, at 10. 
 25. Id. 
 26. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 23, at 5. 
 27. Streb, supra note 21, at 10. 
 28. Id. 
 29. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 23, at 6. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Berkson, supra note 16, at 177 (stating that criticism of nonpartisan elections started 
almost as soon as the elections began). 
 32. PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (1980). 
 33. Streb, supra note 21, at 11. 
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nominating commission.34  Then, in periodic retention elections, the 
public votes on whether the judges appointed by the governor should be 
retained in office.35  Nationwide approval of the merit plan quickly grew, 
and it “is the most common judicial selection method today.”36 
Nevertheless, judicial elections have not disappeared and are still 
very much a part of several states’ judicial selection process.37  And with 
state judicial elections still in existence, so are their critics.38  In fact, the 
ABA opposes judicial elections, stating in a 2003 report: “If we were 
writing on a clean slate, based on what we now see in how judicial 
campaigns have come to be conducted . . . judicial elections would 
gradually be abandoned.”39  Judicial elections are criticized and 
condemned on several levels, including their damaging effect on the 
judiciary’s impartiality and independence.40  Yet because many states 
still select their judges through judicial elections, opponents of judicial 
elections have turned to campaign regulation as a means of minimizing 
the negative impact elections have on the judiciary.41 
B. Regulation of Judicial Elections 
When a judicial candidate announces his or her view on a particular 
legal issue, the impartiality of our judiciary is threatened because the 
candidate is suggesting how he or she would decide that issue if elected.  
If a “special interest” then heavily invests in the candidate on the basis of 
                                                     
 34. PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTION 
CAMPAIGNS 5 (1990).  A nominating commission is composed of lawyers, laypersons, and judges 
who evaluate judicial candidates before nominating.  SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 23, at 7. 
 35. MCFADDEN, supra note 34, at 5. 
 36. Streb, supra note 21, at 11.  However, it should be noted that there are still critics of the 
merit plan. 
Opponents of a merit selection system argue: (1) merit selection is undemocratic; (2) 
judges are selected by small elite groups; (3) merit selection allows for removal, but not 
selection; (4) politics is still a factor at the nomination and appointment level; (5) it is a 
secretive process; (6) bar polls do not accurately reflect the interest of citizens; and (7) 
contested elections make judges accountable and responsive. 
Jay A. Daugherty, The Missouri Non-partisan Court Plan: A Dinosaur on the Edge of Extinction or 
a Survivor in a Changing Socio-Legal Environment?, 62 MO. L. REV. 315, 319 (1997). 
 37. Ruth Ann Watry, The People Who Serve in State Court Systems, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 
OF STATE GOVERNMENT: PEOPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 139, 142–43 (Sean O. Hogan ed., 2006). 
 38. DUBOIS, supra note 32, at 5. 
 39. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, at xii 
(2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judind/jeopardy/pdf/ 
report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 40. DUBOIS, supra note 32, at 5–6. 
 41. Streb & Frederick, supra note 4, at 206–07. 
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his or her announcement, the announcement converts into an implied 
promise—inconsistent with the impartiality of our judiciary—about how 
the particular issue will be decided if the candidate is elected.  Judicial 
candidates, however, have not always been able to seek support by 
announcing their views on disputed legal issues. 
States have restricted judicial campaign conduct since 1924.42  One 
regulation that consistently had been a part of these restrictions was 
known as the “announce” clause, which put limitations on the statements 
judicial candidates could make about their views on disputed legal 
issues.43  The Model Canons of Judicial Ethics, approved by the ABA in 
1924, contained an announce clause stating that a judicial candidate 
“should not announce in advance his conclusions of law on disputed 
issues to secure class support.”44  The 1924 Canons, however, were not 
widely accepted, and by the mid-twentieth century, only eleven states 
had adopted the Canons.45  The 1924 Canons were not written with the 
intention of being “‘a basis for disciplinary action’”46 and were criticized 
for being “more hortatory than helpful in providing firm guidance for the 
solution of difficult questions.”47 
Then, in 1972, the ABA adopted the Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct.48  The Code resolved the problems involved with the Canons 
by establishing clearer, mandatory standards.49  The Code broadened the 
scope of the announce clause by prohibiting judicial candidates from 
announcing their views on “disputed legal issues,” regardless of whether 
the statement’s purpose was to “secure class support.”50 
Many viewed the newer and broader announce clause as an 
excessive limitation on speech and, therefore, a violation of the First 
                                                     
 42. MCFADDEN, supra note 34, at 86. 
 43. See Jim Walker, The Politics of State Courts, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF STATE 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 37, at 171, 180. 
 44. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1924). 
 45. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 786 (2002) (quoting J. MACKENZIE, 
THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 191 (1974)). 
 46. Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 202 (2004) (quoting Rick A. Johnson, Judicial Campaign Speech in 
Kentucky After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 347, 353 (2003)). 
 47. Robert B. McKay, Judges, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Nonjudicial Activities, 1972 
UTAH L. REV. 391, 391. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1972) (amended 2007); see 
also MCFADDEN, supra note 34, at 86 (“The Model Code of Judicial Conduct . . . significantly 
narrowed the range of permissible political talk. . . . Any matter of contemporary political interest, so 
long as it is controversial, is ruled out of bounds.”). 
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Amendment rights of judicial candidates.51  In fact, several courts struck 
the clause down as unconstitutional.52  Therefore, in 1990, the ABA 
eliminated the announce clause from the Code to make the Code less 
restrictive on judicial candidate speech.53  The provision that replaced the 
1972 announce clause, which is referred to as the “commit” clause,54 
stated that judicial candidates could not “make statements that commit or 
appear to commit the candidate . . . to . . . issues . . . likely to come 
before the court.”55  This new restriction aimed to strike a balance 
between the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates and the 
impartiality of the judiciary.56  But despite the ABA erasing the 
announce clause from the Code, nine states still kept the 1972 announce 
clause in their judicial codes until 2002, when the Supreme Court of the 
United States decided Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.57 
1. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 
Minnesota’s Constitution has provided for judicial elections ever 
since Minnesota entered the Union in 1858, and the elections have been 
nonpartisan since 1912.58  In 1974, Minnesota incorporated the announce 
clause into its judicial code.59  Minnesota’s announce clause was based 
entirely on the ABA’s 1972 Code and stated that a judicial candidate 
could not “‘announce his or her views on disputed legal or political 
issues.’”60 
In 1996, Gregory Wersal, a judicial candidate for associate justice of 
the Minnesota Supreme Court, circulated literature while campaigning 
that criticized numerous Minnesota Supreme Court decisions.61  
                                                     
 51. Neil K. Sethi, The Elusive Middle Ground: A Proposed Constitutional Speech Restriction 
for Judicial Selection, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 737–38 (1997). 
 52. See id. at 740–45. 
 53. See Walker, supra note 43, at 180. 
 54. Richard L. Hasen, First Amendment Limits on Regulating Judicial Campaigns, in RUNNING 
FOR JUDGE, supra note 4, at 15, 17. 
 55. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (1990) (amended 2007). 
 56. See Walker, supra note 43, at 180. 
 57. See Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech Be the Solution to Harmful Speech? Judicial 
Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48 S.D. L. REV. 262, 267–68 (2003). 
 58. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002); see also Price, supra note 
12, at 13 (stating that every state to enter the union between 1845 and 1912 provided for judicial 
elections). 
 59. White, 536 U.S. at 768. 
 60. Id. (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000) (abrogated 
2009)). 
 61. Id. 
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Subsequently, an ethics complaint was filed against Wersal, which 
included charges that the literature he distributed violated Minnesota’s 
announce clause.62  The complaint was eventually dropped; however, 
wary of the potential adverse effects of future ethics complaints, Wersal 
withdrew from the judicial election.63 
Two years later, Wersal entered the election for the same office, but 
early into the campaign, he filed suit in federal district court against 
officers of the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards and the Minnesota 
Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, seeking “a declaration that 
the announce clause violate[d] the First Amendment and an injunction 
against its enforcement.”64  The district court held that the announce 
clause did not violate the First Amendment because it served “the state’s 
compelling interest in maintaining the . . . integrity and independence of 
its judiciary, while not unnecessarily curtailing protected speech.”65  
Wersal appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s holding.66  In 2001, the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.67  In a five-to-four 
decision, the Supreme Court found that Minnesota’s announce clause 
violated the First Amendment and, thus, reversed the Eighth Circuit’s 
ruling.68 
a. The Supreme Court’s Definition of the Announce Clause 
In White, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and began his opinion 
by ascertaining the meaning of Minnesota’s announce clause.69  To 
define the announce clause, the Court distinguished an announcement 
from a promise: “We know that ‘announc[ing] . . . views’ on an issue 
covers much more than promising to decide an issue a particular way.  
The prohibition extends to the candidate’s mere statement of his current 
position, even if he does not bind himself to maintain that position after 
election.”70  The Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct contained a 
                                                     
 62. Id. at 768–69. 
 63. Id. at 769. 
 64. Id. at 769–70 & n.3. 
 65. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 986 (D. Minn. 1999), aff’d, 247 
F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001), rev’d sub nom. White, 536 U.S. 765. 
 66. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 885. 
 67. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 534 U.S. 1054 (2001). 
 68. White, 536 U.S. at 765. 
 69. Id. at 770. 
 70. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) 
(2002) (abrogated 2009)). 
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separate clause known as the “pledges or promises” clause,71 based on 
the pledges or promises clause found in the ABA Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct72 and similar to the pledges or promises clauses that most states 
utilizing judicial elections had adopted.73 
Next, to more clearly define the scope of Minnesota’s announce 
clause, the Court discussed the limitations that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court placed on the clause to make it less restrictive.74  First, 
Minnesota’s announce clause did not prevent a judicial candidate from 
criticizing past decisions.75  Second, the clause only prohibited 
statements about “disputed issues that are likely to come before the 
candidate if he is elected judge.”76  Lastly, judicial candidates were still 
permitted to make general statements about case law and judicial 
philosophy.77 
After discussing the limitations that had been placed on the announce 
clause, Justice Scalia asserted that these limitations did not actually 
render the clause less restrictive.78  First, referring to the limitation that 
allows criticism of past decisions, Justice Scalia noted that “respondents 
acknowledged at oral argument that statements critical of past decisions 
are not permissible if the candidate also states that he is against stare 
decisis.”79  In other words, judicial candidates were allowed to be critical 
of past decisions only as long as they also made it clear that, if elected, 
they would adhere to stare decisis, regardless of their views on a 
particular issue.80  Next, in discussing the limitation that narrowed the 
scope of the announce clause to only “disputed issues that are likely to 
come before the candidate if he is elected,”81 the majority pointed out 
that the only disputed issues expected to be raised in a state judicial 
election are those issues that are likely to come before a state court.82  
Justice Scalia reasoned that it is very unlikely that a state judicial election 
would spark a discussion about “whether the Federal Government should 
                                                     
 71. Id. 
 72. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (1990) (amended 2007). 
 73. See Hasen, supra note 54, at 17. 
 74. White, 536 U.S. at 771. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 772. 
 78. Id. at 772–73. 
 79. Id. at 772. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 771. 
 82. Id. at 772. 
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end the embargo of Cuba.”83  Lastly, the Court contended that the 
announce clause limitation allowing for discussion of judicial philosophy 
did not accomplish anything because judicial philosophy means nothing 
to the electorate unless the philosophy is applied to a specific issue.84 
After rejecting the limiting effect of each announce clause limitation, 
Justice Scalia concluded that Minnesota’s announce clause could be 
defined as prohibiting 
a judicial candidate from stating his views on any specific nonfanciful 
legal question within the province of the court for which he is running, 
except in the context of discussing past decisions—and in the latter 
context as well, if he expresses the view that he is not bound by stare 
decisis.85 
b. The Announce Clause Failed Strict Scrutiny 
Based on the definition of Minnesota’s announce clause arrived at by 
the Court, the majority concluded that the clause prohibited “speech on 
the basis of its content and burden[ed] a category of speech that is ‘at the 
core of our First Amendment freedoms’—speech about the qualifications 
of candidates for public office.”86  For this reason, the Court needed to 
analyze the announce clause under the strict scrutiny standard—the 
clause could be held constitutional only if it served a compelling state 
interest and was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.87  The Court 
stated that the announce clause would be narrowly tailored only if it did 
not “‘unnecessarily circumscrib[e] protected expression.’”88 
The Eighth Circuit determined that the respondents had established 
two compelling state interests served by the announce clause: preserving 
impartiality and the appearance of impartiality.89  The Supreme Court, 
however, determined that the respondents were unclear about their 
definition of impartiality and that a clear definition was needed before it 
could decide whether impartiality was a compelling state interest.90  
Therefore, the Court walked through three possible definitions of 
                                                     
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 773. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 774 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 2001), 
rev’d sub nom. White, 536 U.S. 765). 
 87. Id. at 774–75. 
 88. Id. at 775 (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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impartiality and determined whether each definition was a compelling 
state interest and, if so, whether the announce clause was narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.91 
First, the Court analyzed the validity of the announce clause if 
impartiality were defined as a “lack of bias for or against either party to 
the proceeding.”92  Although the Court acknowledged that this definition 
of impartiality was the traditional meaning—and did not refute that it 
was a compelling interest—the Court concluded that the announce clause 
was not narrowly tailored to serve this definition of impartiality because 
it restricted speech about issues, not parties.93  Justice Scalia wrote: 
[W]hen a case arises that turns on a legal issue on which the judge (as a 
candidate) had taken a particular stand, the party taking the opposite 
stand is likely to lose.  But not because of any bias against that party, or 
favoritism toward the other party. . . . [Rather, t]he judge is applying 
the law (as he sees it) evenhandedly.94 
Next, the Court considered the announce clause’s validity if 
impartiality were defined as the “lack of preconception in favor of or 
against a particular legal view.”95  The Court quickly dismissed this 
definition, concluding that a lack of preconceptions about the law was 
not a compelling interest because it is beyond the bounds of possibility to 
think that a judge without preconceptions about the law exists.96 
Lastly, the Court discussed the validity of the announce clause if 
impartiality were defined as “openmindedness.”97  The Court explained 
that an openminded judge would still have preconceptions; however, he 
would listen to opposing views with an open mind and be willing to be 
persuaded.98  It was proposed that preventing judicial candidates from 
making statements about their views on disputed legal issues would 
preserve openmindedness because it would relieve “a judge from 
pressure to rule a certain way in order to maintain consistency with 
statements the judge has previously made.”99  The Court left open the 
question of whether this definition of impartiality was a compelling state 
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interest because the Minnesota announce clause at issue did not adopt 
it.100 
However, the Court concluded that even if openmindedness was a 
compelling state interest, the announce clause was not narrowly tailored 
to serve that interest.101  The absence of narrow tailoring, the Court 
explained, was based on the fact that the announce clause only prohibited 
speech during judicial campaigns.102  The Court reasoned that judicial 
candidates make statements about disputed legal issues before being a 
candidate and outside the judicial arena—as guest lecturers, authors, 
etc.103—and a judge does not necessarily feel more bound to adhere to 
statements made during a campaign than those made outside of a 
campaign.104 
Before reaching the end of its opinion, the majority reiterated the 
difference between campaign promises and nonpromissory statements, 
stating that it “might be plausible” that an elected judicial candidate 
would act without impartiality due to a “reluctance to contradict” 
campaign promises but that nonpromissory statements are not “uniquely 
destructive” of impartiality.105  The Court ultimately held that 
Minnesota’s announce clause did not pass strict scrutiny and, therefore, 
“prohibiting candidates for judicial election from announcing their views 
on disputed . . . issues” violated the First Amendment.106 
2. Post-White Regulation of Judicial Candidates’ Speech 
The White decision sparked debate about what speech could 
constitutionally be prohibited during judicial elections.107  With the 
elimination of the announce clause, a few states have completely 
removed prohibitions of speech about “cases, controversies, or issues 
that are likely to come before the court” from their judicial codes.108  
Most states, however, have maintained some level of regulation, and 
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 103. Id. at 778–79. 
 104. Id. at 778–81. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 788. 
 107. See Rachel P. Caufield, The Changing Tone of Judicial Election Campaigns as a Result of 
White, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 4, at 34, 39. 
 108. See CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4; DEL. JUDGES’ CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 7; KY. SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 5(B)(1)(c); N.J. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 7; N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7; VA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5. 
MOENIUS FINAL 7/6/2011  4:57 PM 
1114 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
there seem to be two different types of speech regulation that state 
judicial codes have settled on for “cases, controversies, or issues that are 
likely to come before the court”: the pledges or promises clause and the 
commit clause.109 
a. The Pledges or Promises Clause 
A majority of the states that regulate judicial candidate speech have 
adopted a provision known as the pledges or promises clause.110  The 
pledges or promises clause prohibits judicial candidates from making 
“pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the duties of the office.”111  The basis for the 
pledges and promises clause is quite clear: if a judicial candidate 
attempts to gain votes by promises to decide cases in a particular way, 
his impartiality will be severely handicapped when that particular case 
comes before him as a judge.112 
Although a majority of states have adopted a pledges or promises 
clause,113 and despite the fact that the White Court recognized the pledges 
or promises clause to be narrower than the announce clause,114 White has 
sparked debate over whether the pledges or promises clause is 
constitutional.115  Georgia eliminated the pledges or promises clause 
from its judicial code after White.116  North Carolina, among several 
other drastic changes to its judicial code, also abolished its pledges or 
promises clause because of White.117  In addition to these alterations in 
states’ judicial codes, some courts have held the pledges or promises 
clause unconstitutional.118 
In 2004, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Kentucky struck down Kentucky’s pledges or promises clause as 
                                                     
 109. See Appendix infra Part V. 
 110. See Appendix infra Part V. 
 111. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (1999) (amended in 2007). 
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 116. See Caufield, supra note 107, at 43. 
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 118. See N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1042 (D.N.D. 2005); 
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unconstitutionally overbroad.119  The court held that the pledges or 
promises clause was overbroad in that it was not limited to “promises to 
rule a certain way on issues likely to come before the court”120 but 
instead prohibited all “‘pledges or promises of conduct in office other 
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the 
office.’”121  The court concluded by stating that Kentucky’s pledges or 
promises clause prohibited “broad areas of speech the Supreme Court 
found to be protected in White.”122  In 2005, the pledges or promises 
clause was deleted from Kentucky’s judicial code to conform with the 
district court’s holding.123 
Despite these eliminations of the pledges or promises clause, a 
majority of the states has retained the pledges or promises clause post-
White, and there have been several decisions explicitly upholding the 
clause’s constitutionality.  In 2003, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld 
Florida’s pledges or promises clause, stating that the clause was narrowly 
tailored to serve the state’s compelling interest “in preserving the 
integrity of our judiciary and maintaining the public’s confidence in an 
impartial judiciary.”124 
Also in 2003, the Court of Appeals of New York upheld New York’s 
pledges or promises clause.125  The court distinguished the pledges or 
promises clause from the announce clause, stating that the pledges or 
promises clause did not restrict candidates from stating their views on 
legal issues, as long as those statements were not promises “inconsistent 
with the faithful and impartial performance of judicial duties.”126  The 
court reasoned that such prohibition is necessary because “[j]udges must 
apply the law faithfully and impartially—they are not elected to aid 
particular groups, be it the police, the prosecution, or the defense bar.  
Campaign promises that suggest otherwise gravely risk distorting public 
perception of the judicial role.”127 
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b. The Commit Clause 
Although facially narrower than the announce clause, most commit 
clauses track the language of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and 
broadly restrict campaign speech by prohibiting judicial candidates from 
making “statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with 
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the 
court.”128  The commit clause is often compared to the announce clause 
because, as stated earlier, the commit clause replaced the announce 
clause language in the 1990 Model Code.129  Despite its alleged 
similarities to the announce clause, some courts have held the commit 
clause constitutional.130  For example, the Florida Supreme Court, which 
upheld the constitutionality of the pledges or promises clause, also 
upheld Florida’s commit clause as narrowly tailored.131  Furthermore, 
fifteen states, despite the White decision, continue to restrict judicial 
candidate speech through the commit clause.132 
The “appear to commit” language of the commit clause is the fuel of 
the clause’s debate.133  Three states—California, Georgia, and 
Pennsylvania—have retained the commit clause but have eliminated the 
appear to commit language.134  Since White, a number of courts have 
struck down the constitutionality of the appear to commit language.  
Some believe that because an announcement could appear to commit a 
judicial candidate to the substance of that announcement, there is no 
difference between the announce clause and the appear to commit 
language of the commit clause.135  For example, Kentucky and North 
Dakota, in invalidating their commit clauses, both reasoned that the only 
difference between the commit clause and the announce clause was their 
label.136 
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In sum, despite the fact that some states are fighting to maintain an 
impartial judiciary after White, it is clear that White’s invalidation of the 
announce clause sparked a storm in the field of judicial campaign speech 
regulations and has caused even further deterioration of those 
regulations. 
C. Judicial Elections and Campaign Expenditures 
Issues sparked by judicial elections involve far more than those 
surrounding the speech of judicial candidates.  Two recent Supreme 
Court decisions addressed the issues involved with campaign 
expenditures.  First, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Court 
presented recusal as an “impartiality protector” when substantial funds 
were used by a litigant to place the judge on the bench.137  Furthermore, 
the facts of Caperton provided a powerful warning to the Court of what 
could become of our elected judiciary if unrestricted amounts of money 
began to flow into judicial campaigns.  Then, in 2010, in Citizens United 
v. FEC, the Court held that campaign expenditures made on behalf of 
corporations cannot be restricted.138  Unfortunately, the Court ignored 
Caperton’s warning and did not exclude judicial elections from Citizens 
United’s holding.  It thus opened the door for substantial corporate 
treasury funds to buy promises of partial decisions from our “impartial” 
elected judiciary. 
1. Buckley v. Valeo 
First, before discussing the recent developments in campaign-
expenditures law, it is important to note the Supreme Court’s landmark 
campaign-finance decision: Buckley v. Valeo.  The relevant issue in 
Buckley involved the validity of limitations on campaign contributions 
and third-party expenditures put into place by the Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (FECA).139 
The Buckley Court held that spending money on political campaigns, 
both through contributions and expenditures, is a form of “speech” 
protected by the First Amendment.140  Therefore, the Court subjected the 
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limitations at issue to strict scrutiny.141  In reaching its decision, the 
Court recognized that the government has an “interest in preventing 
corruption and the appearance of corruption.”142  The Court ruled, 
however, that when balanced against the competing free speech interest, 
the government interest in preventing corruption carries less weight in 
the campaign expenditures arena than it does in the campaign 
contributions arena.143  First, the Court concluded that “the reality or 
appearance of improper influence stem[s] from the dependence of 
candidates on large campaign contributions” and, therefore, the 
restrictions on campaign contributions “serve the basic governmental 
interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process.”144 
Conversely, the Court also concluded that the FECA’s limitations on 
campaign expenditures were a much more significant restriction on First 
Amendment speech.145  Furthermore, the Court asserted that independent 
expenditures by third parties did not result in improper commitments 
from candidates because they lack the “prearrangement and 
coordination” involved in campaign contributions.146  Thus, the Court 
held that the FECA’s expenditure restrictions were not narrowly tailored 
to serve the government interest in preventing corruption.147 
In sum, the Buckley Court upheld FECA’s restrictions on campaign 
contributions but struck down its limits on campaign expenditures, 
reasoning that independent campaign expenditures do not result in the 
kind of corruption and appearance of corruption that can result from 
campaign contributions. 
2. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 
Despite the Court’s reasoning in Buckley, the alarming facts of 
Caperton demonstrate that unrestricted expenditures in judicial elections 
can result in corruption and, at the very least, the appearance of 
corruption.  In 1998, Hugh Caperton, Harman Development Corp., 
Harman Mining Corp., and Sovereign Coal Sales (Caperton) filed an 
action in the Circuit Court of Boone County, West Virginia, against A.T. 
Massey Coal Co. and its affiliates (Massey) for fraudulent 
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misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious interference with existing 
contractual relations.148  The jury found Massey liable, and Caperton was 
awarded $50 million in compensatory and punitive damages.149  Massey 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.150 
Before the appeal, however, West Virginia held its 2004 judicial 
elections.151  Massey’s chairman, Don Blankenship, “[k]nowing the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia would consider the appeal in 
the case,” decided to support a candidate for the Supreme Court of 
Appeals, Brent Benjamin.152  The statutory maximum that Blankenship 
could contribute to Benjamin’s campaign committee was $1000.  But in 
addition to the $1000, Blankenship donated around $2.5 million to “And 
For The Sake Of The Kids,” a political organization that opposed 
Benjamin’s opponent and supported Benjamin.153  Moreover, 
Blankenship spent “just over $500,000 on independent expenditures—for 
direct mailings and letters soliciting donations as well as television and 
newspaper advertisements” supporting Benjamin.154 
Benjamin won and Caperton subsequently moved to disqualify him 
because of “the conflict caused by Blankenship’s campaign 
involvement.”155  Justice Benjamin denied the motion, and review of the 
case was granted.156  Then, in November 2007, the Supreme Court of 
Appeals, with Justice Benjamin casting the crucial vote to form the 
majority, reversed the jury verdict against Massey.157 
Caperton sought rehearing and moved again to disqualify Justice 
Benjamin as well as Justice Maynard, who also voted for the majority, 
because of photos found of Justice Maynard vacationing in the French 
Riviera with Blankenship while the case was pending.158  Massey also 
moved to disqualify Justice Starcher, who dissented, apparently due to 
Starcher’s public criticism of Blankenship’s campaign contributions.159  
Justice Maynard and Justice Starcher both granted the recusal motions, 
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and in Justice Starcher’s recusal memorandum, he “urged Justice 
Benjamin to recuse himself as well.”160  However, Justice Benjamin 
denied the recusal motion.161  Justice Benjamin sat as chief justice, and 
Caperton moved a third time to disqualify him, but Justice Benjamin 
denied the motion yet again.162  The court again reversed the jury verdict, 
and the dissent stated that there were “‘genuine due process implications 
arising under federal law’” because of Justice Benjamin’s refusal to 
withdraw.163 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide 
whether Justice Benjamin violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause by failing to recuse himself.164  The Court held that 
judges are required to recuse themselves “when a person with a personal 
stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence 
in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s 
election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”165  Yet the 
Court acknowledged that knowing whether a particular contribution 
caused a judicial candidate’s successful election was nearly 
impossible.166  Therefore, the Court determined that “[d]ue process 
requires an objective inquiry into whether the contributor’s influence on 
the election under all the circumstances” would tempt the judge to 
abandon judicial duties of impartiality.167  Applying this standard to the 
facts and holding that Benjamin improperly failed to recuse himself, the 
Court stated: 
In an election decided by fewer than 50,000 votes . . . Blankenship’s 
campaign contributions—in comparison to the total amount contributed 
to the campaign, as well as the total amount spent in the election—had 
a significant and disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome.  
And the risk that Blankenship’s influence engendered actual bias is 
sufficiently substantial that it “must be forbidden if the guarantee of 
due process is to be adequately implemented.”168 
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The facts of Caperton proved that, even though expenditures lack the 
“prearrangement and coordination” involved in campaign contributions, 
substantial campaign expenditures can result in improper commitments 
and, thus, corrupt our judiciary.169  Unfortunately, the Court’s 2010 
Citizens United decision disregarded Caperton’s warnings and exposed 
judicial elections to unlimited and influential corporate treasury funds. 
3. Citizens United v. FEC 
In January 2008, Citizens United, a nonprofit organization, released 
a documentary entitled Hillary: The Movie—which was critical of then-
Senator Hillary Clinton—in theaters and on DVD.170  Citizens United 
also wanted to make the documentary available through video-on-
demand thirty days before the 2008 presidential primary elections.171  
However, because Citizens United would have had to pay over $1 
million dollars to make the documentary available through video-on-
demand and because Citizens United wanted to promote the video-on-
demand option through television advertisements, it feared that it would 
be banned from doing so under 2 U.S.C. § 441b.172  Section 441b, as 
amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), is a 
federal law that “prohibits corporations and unions from using their 
general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech 
defined as an ‘electioneering communication’ or for speech expressly 
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.”173 
Therefore, in 2007, Citizens United filed an action in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the FEC, arguing that § 441b was 
unconstitutional as applied to the documentary and that BCRA’s 
disclaimer and disclosure requirements were unconstitutional as applied 
to the documentary and its ads.174  The district court denied Citizens  
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United’s motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the FEC.175  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.176 
After oral arguments, the Court ordered rearguments, asking the 
parties whether it should overrule two prior cases: Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce and McConnell v. FEC.177  In Austin, the Court 
upheld the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, which prohibited 
“corporations from using corporate treasury funds for independent 
expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in elections 
for state office.”178  In holding that the Act did not violate the First or 
Fourteenth Amendments, the Court stated that “[c]orporate wealth can 
unfairly influence elections.”179  In McConnell, the Court relied on Austin 
and upheld BCRA’s limits on corporations’ and unions’ funding of 
electioneering communications.180  It is important to note, however, that 
corporations and unions could make campaign contributions and 
expenditures through separate segregated funds—PACs—consisting 
entirely of voluntary contributions.181 
Ultimately, in a five-to-four decision, the Court overruled Austin, 
striking down § 441b’s prohibition of independent corporate 
expenditures.182  As a result, the Court also overruled “the part of 
McConnell that upheld BCRA § 203’s extension of § 441b’s restrictions 
on corporate independent expenditures” to electioneering 
communications.183  In reaching its conclusion, the Court held that  
§ 441b’s restriction “on corporate independent expenditures [was] a ban 
of speech”184 and that “the Government may not suppress political 
speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”185 
The government argued that the restrictions on corporate 
independent expenditures were necessary “to prevent corruption or its 
appearance.”186  The Court, however, echoing much of the Buckley 
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Court’s reasoning, concluded that corporate independent expenditures 
“do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”187  The 
Court stated that just because a corporation has influence “over . . . 
elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”188 
The Court did not distinguish “between judicial elections and 
elections for legislative or executive branch offices,” and thus made the 
Citizens United holding “generally applicable to all elections.”189  For 
reasons discussed below, however, this is a distinction that should have 
been drawn.190  Furthermore, although the total impact that Citizens 
United will have on judicial elections is yet to be seen, it will be 
significant.  In his dissent, Justice Stevens expressed his concern for the 
effect Citizens United will have on judicial elections: “At a time when 
concerns about the conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever 
pitch, the Court today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union 
general treasury spending in these races.”191 
Moreover, the same fear that nonpartisan judicial elections 
sparked—the fear that elections would be determined by “special 
interests such as insurance companies, big business, labor unions, or 
segments of the legal profession”192—has resurfaced by allowing 
unregulated corporate treasury funds into judicial elections.193  Twenty 
national, regional, and state organizations and a former chief justice of 
the Georgia Supreme Court explained this fear in an amicus brief filed in 
Citizens United: 
Special interest spending on judicial elections—by corporations, labor 
unions, and other groups—poses an unprecedented threat to public trust 
in the courts and to the rights of litigants.  This has been recognized and 
discussed by journalists, academics, and leading jurists, including the 
Conference of Chief Justices.  This Court itself held last term in 
[Caperton] that some independent expenditures in judicial campaigns 
are so excessive that they in fact deny litigants due process under the  
                                                     
 187. Id. at 909. 
 188. Id. at 910. 
 189. Shira J. Goodman et al., What’s More Important: Electing Judges or Judicial 
Independence? It’s Time for Pennsylvania to Choose Judicial Independence, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 859, 
882 (2010). 
 190. See infra Part III.C.3.b. 
 191. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 192. SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 23, at 6. 
 193. See Brief of Amici Curiae Justice at Stake et al. in Support of Appellee at 2, Citizens 
United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365225. 
MOENIUS FINAL 7/6/2011  4:57 PM 
1124 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
law.  If corporate treasury spending were unregulated in judicial 
elections, these concerns would only get worse.194 
In sum, before Citizens United, corporations were limited to 
voluntary contributions from their PACs.  Now, however, by allowing 
corporations to make campaign expenditures from their general treasury 
funds, Citizens United equips corporations with excessively more power 
to influence judicial elections.  This unregulated power to expend endless 
amounts of money to ensure that a particular candidate is put on the 
bench, combined with the substantial deterioration of judicial campaign 
speech regulations, allows corporations to buy promises of partial 
decisions, and thus nearly erases the minimal independence left in the 
elected judiciary. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Role of the Judiciary and Judicial Elections 
As one prominent federal judge has explained: “There is one 
qualification which is the sine qua non of judicial success or even 
judicial respectability.  That quality is independence.”195  The 
independence of the judiciary is what sets it apart from other branches of 
government.  The judiciary must not act as anyone’s or anything’s agent 
and should “not be swayed by public clamor”196 but, instead, should 
“perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.”197  
Ironically, judicial elections, which were adopted as an attempt to 
provide the judiciary with more independence, have depreciated the 
judiciary’s independence.198  What began as an effort to ensure that 
judges were not agents of the legislature served as the catalyst that 
morphed elected judges into agents of the electorate.199  Judicial elections 
have transformed our impartial keepers of justice into politicians.  Judge 
John Parker, who was Senior Judge of the United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, stated in 1947: “To see, as I have seen, a 
candidate for the judgeship advertising his candidacy and soliciting the 
support of all sorts of politicians . . . is a sight to make the angels 
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weep.”200  In her White concurrence, Justice O’Connor argued that 
judicial election regulations were not the primary concern but that “the 
very practice of electing judges undermines” an impartial judiciary.201 
Opponents of judicial elections have looked towards judicial 
campaign regulations as a possible means to minimize the risk of further 
diminishing impartiality.202  Unfortunately, several decisions throughout 
the past decade have chipped away at these regulations to the point that 
judicial elections seem almost no different from legislative elections.  
Many have begun to feel that “justice is for sale.”203  Arguably, from a 
“consumer” standpoint, it would be cheaper to purchase a few judges 
than it would be to buy an entire legislature.  An Ohio Supreme Court 
justice told the New York Times, “‘I never felt so much like a hooker 
down by the bus station . . . as I did in a judicial race.’”204 
However, “‘[j]udicial reform is no sport for the short-winded,’”205 
and judicial elections do not seem to be disappearing anytime soon.  
Therefore, those who are unflinchingly holding on to hope that the 
judiciary will one day reflect the impartiality our nation’s founders had 
in mind when they opted for judicial appointments should continue to 
focus on rebuilding what have become almost meaningless campaign 
regulations. 
B. The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Promissory Campaign 
Statements 
As discussed earlier, a majority of the states that regulate judicial 
campaign speech do so by prohibiting judicial candidates from making 
certain pledges, promises, and—in twenty-two of those states—
commitments.206  Furthermore, three of the states that have retained the 
commit clause have eliminated the “appear to commit” language, thus 
only prohibiting “statements that commit.”207  When a candidate pledges, 
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promises, or commits, he or she presumably intends to do so and is 
aware of that pledge, promise, or commitment.  Thus, these judicial 
codes are prohibiting promissory statements—statements “containing or 
conveying a promise or assurance.”208  For reasons discussed below, 
prohibiting judicial candidates from making certain promissory 
statements does not violate the First Amendment. 
1. Pledges and Promises 
For those states that have retained some form of restrictions on 
judicial campaign speech regarding candidates’ views on specific legal 
issues, the narrowest speech regulation is the pledges or promises 
clause.209  Courts that have struck down the clause heavily rely on the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in White.210  White’s reasoning, however, is a 
strong argument for the constitutionality of the pledges or promises 
clause. 
First, the White Court explicitly stated that “‘announc[ing] . . . views’ 
on an issue covers much more than promising to decide an issue a 
particular way.”211  The Eastern District of Kentucky’s conclusion that 
the pledges or promises clause prohibits the same speech that the Court 
labeled as protected in White is completely invalidated by the White 
Court’s repeated distinction between promissory and nonpromissory 
statements and the Court’s suggestion that promissory statements could 
plausibly impair impartiality.212 
Moreover, even without consideration of White’s distinction between 
announcements and promises, the White framework still renders the 
pledges or promises clause constitutional.  First, the clause satisfies the 
compelling-state-interest prong of strict scrutiny.  In White, the Court 
played with the idea of “openmindedness” being a compelling state 
interest but ultimately left the question unanswered because Minnesota 
did not define impartiality as openmindedness.213  It is difficult to argue, 
however, that a state would not have a compelling state interest in an 
openminded judiciary.  Furthermore, the ABA and twenty of the twenty-
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eight states that have a pledges or promises clause in their judicial code 
have defined impartiality as the maintenance of an open mind.214 
Additionally, based on White’s reasoning in holding that the 
announce clause was not narrowly tailored to promote openmindedness, 
the pledges or promises clause is narrowly tailored to promote 
openmindedness.  The White Court reasoned that the announce clause 
was not narrowly tailored because it permitted judicial candidates to 
announce their views on disputed legal issues right up to the start of a 
campaign.215  However, clearly distinguishable from a prospective 
judicial candidate announcing his view on a particular legal issue before 
the start of a campaign, a prospective judicial candidate—outside of a 
judicial campaign—would have no reason to make a promise about 
future issues likely to come before a particular court.  Moreover, a 
promise made during a judicial campaign is particularly bothersome 
because the candidate makes it for the purpose of being elected to the 
bench.  Because judicial candidates have yet to be elected, their 
promissory statements are asserting: “If you elect me to the bench, I 
promise x, y, and z.”  There would be no reason for such a statement 
outside of the campaign arena.  For these reasons, the pledges and 
promises clause is narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest 
of openmindedness, and, thus, it is constitutional to prohibit judicial 
candidates from making certain promises and pledges. 
2. Commitments and Statements That Commit 
Twenty-two of the states that regulate judicial campaign speech 
through the pledges and promises clause have added the word 
“commitments” to prohibit judicial candidates from making “pledges, 
promises, and commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial 
performance” of judicial duties.216  Generally, this addition to a state’s 
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pledges or promises clause is the result of other alterations in the judicial 
code, such as eliminating the commit clause.217  Yet some have asserted 
that the addition of commitments to the pledges or promises clause 
transforms the clause to a commit clause.218 
In Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, a Sedgwick County judicial 
candidate challenged the constitutionality of Kansas’s pledges or 
promises clause and commit clause.219  However, before the case was 
decided, the Kansas Supreme Court amended the state’s judicial code.220  
The amendment deleted the code’s commit clause221 and added the word 
commitments to its pledges or promises clause.222  When the Tenth 
Circuit held that this amendment rendered the case moot, the plaintiffs 
argued that the campaign speech regulations were still 
unconstitutional.223 
The plaintiffs contended that even though pledge, promise, and 
commit facially appear to have the same meaning, the addition of 
commitments points towards an intention to expand the meaning of the 
pledges or promises clause.224  The Kansas Supreme Court, however, 
concluded that “‘[c]ommit’ connotes a similar meaning to ‘pledge’ or 
‘promise.’”225  Thus, the addition of commitments to the pledges or 
promises clause did not broaden the scope of the original pledges or 
promises clause and merely reinforced the idea that judicial candidates 
cannot bind themselves to a “particular disposition with regard to a 
particular issue.”226 
At this point, it is important to note that there is no arguable 
difference between a commitment and a statement that commits.  Thus, it 
follows from the above discussion—which equated pledges and promises 
to commitments—that there is no distinguishable difference between a 
pledges or promises clause and a commit clause that has eliminated the 
appear to commit language and merely prohibits “statements that 
commit.” 
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In sum, judicial codes that prohibit certain pledges, promises, 
commitments, and statements that commit are all prohibiting the same 
thing: promissory statements.  Furthermore, prohibiting judicial 
candidates from making certain promissory statements is constitutional 
because such prohibition is narrowly tailored to serve the compelling 
state interest of openmindedness.  Not only is the prohibition of 
promissory statements constitutional, but the added power that Citizens 
United gives to “special interests” to control judicial elections renders it 
necessary to prohibit judicial candidates from seeking support by making 
promises about future conduct. 
C. The Constitutionality and Necessity of the Announce Clause 
Part III.B established that it is constitutional for states to prohibit 
judicial candidates from making promissory statements about issues 
likely to come before the court.  Yet under White, it is unconstitutional to 
prohibit judicial candidates from making nonpromissory statements.  
Now, however, after Citizens United, unregulated campaign spending 
from corporations’ treasury funds can convert nonpromissory campaign 
statements into implied promissory statements, which are inconsistent 
with the impartiality of our judiciary.  Therefore, to maintain the 
impartiality of our judiciary, White and Citizens United cannot live 
together. 
1. The Announce Clause’s Unconstitutionality Pre-Citizens United 
Before Citizens United, the Supreme Court correctly concluded in 
White that states cannot prohibit judicial candidates from announcing 
their views on disputed legal issues.227  For example, it would 
unnecessarily circumscribe protected expression if the public was simply 
curious about a candidate’s view on sex-offender sentencing laws and the 
candidate could not announce his view purely for the purpose of 
fulfilling the public’s curiosity. 
Unfortunately, the foul reality that courts continue to tiptoe around is 
that no judicial candidate would announce his views on a disputed legal 
issue without the motive of securing votes.  Furthermore, no voting 
citizen would receive the announcement without interpreting it as an 
indication of how the candidate would carry out his duties if elected.  
Many were dissatisfied with the 1972 Model Code’s elimination of the 
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“to secure class support” language from the announce clause,228 arguing 
that the elimination broadened the clause’s scope.229  However, it is 
entirely naïve to think that a judicial candidate would announce his 
stance on an issue without the purpose of securing votes. 
Disappointingly, because courts have yet to acknowledge this pink 
elephant in the judicial campaign arena and because there is no reliable 
way of proving a candidate’s motive behind a campaign statement, the 
Court correctly held that prohibiting nonpromissory campaign statements 
violated the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates. 
2. Citizens United’s Invalidation of White 
In 2010, when the Supreme Court concluded in Citizens United that 
the First Amendment prohibited restrictions on corporate campaign 
expenditures, it created a need for courts to acknowledge the reality 
behind nonpromissory judicial campaign statements.230  If the judiciary is 
to reflect even the slightest degree of the impartiality that is the sine qua 
non of judicial success, it is hard to imagine how White and Citizens 
United can live together. 
White rests on the notion that the announce clause is unconstitutional 
because a nonpromissory campaign statement is not uniquely destructive 
of impartiality.  After Citizens United, however, it is clearer than ever 
that what begins as a nonpromissory campaign statement can effortlessly 
transform into an implied promise that is inconsistent with the impartial 
performance of judicial duties.  For example, before Citizens United the 
campaign statement, “I think the previous court’s verdicts in products 
liability cases were far too excessive,” would be deemed a 
nonpromissory campaign statement, and although the candidate would 
clearly have a motive to secure votes by making the statement, he could 
not constitutionally be prohibited from doing so.  Now, however, if a 
judicial candidate made that statement and a large insurance company 
subsequently expended a great deal of money to put out several 
advertisements for the candidate or against the candidate’s opponent, the 
nonpromissory campaign statement transforms into an implied promise 
to the insurance company to minimize verdicts in products liability cases. 
This implied transformation is rooted in the politics that have 
become so intertwined with judicial elections.  After the White decision, 
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then-ABA president Robert Hirshon stated that “‘now we are going to 
have judicial candidates running for office by announcing their position 
on particular issues.  They will know that the voters will evaluate their 
performance in office on how closely their rulings comport with those 
positions.’”231  Hirshon’s concerns are now multiplied by the pressure 
and indebtedness judges naturally will feel towards those corporations 
and organizations that make substantial expenditures on the judicial 
candidate’s behalf. 
Furthermore, in addition to indebtedness, a judicial candidate may be 
fearful of the repercussions that will follow from contradicting the 
campaign statement.  For example, the judicial candidate supported by 
the insurance company may not want to hand down a substantial verdict, 
regardless of special circumstances involved in the case, out of fear of 
losing the insurance company’s support—or gaining the company’s 
opposition—in a future re-election campaign. 
Additionally, these ramifications of Citizens United provide 
corporations with an unacceptable degree of power in the law-making 
process.  Part of the motivation behind the merit system of judicial 
appointments and retention was the fear produced by nonpartisan 
elections that close races would be decided by “special interests.”232  This 
fear is especially valid when coupled with the White Court’s 
acknowledgement of an uninformed electorate.233  Because the general 
public knows little about judicial qualifications, an uninformed citizen is 
likely—when choosing between two judicial candidates she knows little 
about—to vote for the judge she remembers seeing the insurance 
company’s advertisements for, or maybe even more understandably, not 
vote for the judge she saw advertisements against.  Because of the 
indebtedness and dependence judges may feel to corporations and 
organizations that quite obviously had a lot to do with putting those 
judges on the bench, not only will special interests be deciding races but 
they will be deciding law. 
The pressure, indebtedness, fear, and dependence that Citizens 
United will place on elected judges entirely undermines the impartiality 
of the judiciary.  Citizens United has inflicted upon us the injustice that 
our nation’s founding fathers sought to avoid.  John Marshall stated 
during a debate on the Virginia Constitution: 
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The Judicial Department comes home in its effects to every man’s 
fireside: it passes on his property, his reputation, his life, his all.  Is it 
not, to the last degree important, that he [the judge] should be rendered 
perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to influence or 
controul him but God and his conscience? . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . I have always thought, from my earliest youth till now, that the 
greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and 
a sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent 
Judiciary.234 
Therefore, something must be done to correct what a decade of 
decisions, capped off by Citizens United, has slowly converted our 
impartial judiciary into: an indebted, influenced, and dependent 
judiciary. 
3. Severing White and Citizens United 
a. Overruling White 
The first, but most unlikely and unrealistic, solution would be to 
overrule White.  But while it is unlikely, there is still a strong argument 
to be made for overruling White to correct the injury to judicial 
impartiality that Citizens United has caused.  Without campaign 
announcements of views on disputed legal issues, elected judges will not 
be tempted to sway away from impartiality to avoid contradicting their 
campaign statements.  Before Citizens United an elected judge still could 
have felt hesitation about contradicting a past statement, just as any 
human being does.  Now, however, with the added pressure, 
indebtedness, dependence, and fear caused by substantial expenditures 
made by special interests, surrendering to the temptation to avoid 
contradicting a campaign statement will be almost automatic—regardless 
of impartiality considerations.  Therefore, prohibiting judicial candidates 
from making such statements is an obvious solution. 
Despite the effectiveness of overruling White, the doctrine of stare 
decisis renders it an unlikely and unrealistic solution.  The Court has 
reiterated many times, however, that stare decisis “is a rule of policy, not 
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a rule of law.”235  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey, the Court identified four “prudential and pragmatic” factors to 
balance when deciding whether to overrule a prior decision: (1) “whether 
the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical 
workability,”236 (2) “whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that 
would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling,”237 (3) 
“whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left 
the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine,”238 and (4) 
“whether [the rule’s] premises of fact have so far changed . . . as to 
render its central holding somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing 
with the issue it addressed.”239 
The last factor listed by the Casey Court, whether White’s premises 
of “fact have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have 
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification,”240 appears 
to provide the strongest basis for overruling White.  Citizens United has 
so changed White’s premises of fact as to rob White of its justification.  
First, in White, the majority concluded that “lack of bias for or against 
either party to a proceeding” was a compelling state interest but that the 
announce clause was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest because 
it restricted speech about issues, not parties.241  Justice Scalia reasoned 
that when an issue comes before a judge—which the judge took a 
particular stance on during his campaign—“the party taking the opposite 
stand is likely to lose.  But not because [of] . . . favoritism toward the 
other party. . . . [Rather, t]he judge is applying the law (as he sees it) 
evenhandedly.”242 
Now, however, Citizens United’s substantial expenditures make the 
distinction between opinions on legal issues and favoritism towards 
particular parties incredibly murky.  For example, before Citizens United, 
if the judge who made the campaign statement, “I think the previous 
court’s products liability verdicts were too excessive,” hands down less 
substantial verdicts, it is hard to argue that he is doing so because of 
favoritism towards the defendants.  Now, however, with a large 
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insurance company’s substantial campaign expenditures, the judge’s less 
substantial verdicts begin to look less like an evenhanded application of 
the law and more like favoritism towards the insurance company or bias 
against the company’s “opponents.” 
Secondly, the White Court determined that the announce clause 
unnecessarily circumscribed protected expression; however, the addition 
of Citizens United to White unnecessarily harms the administration of 
justice.  The perfect balance appears impossible to ascertain, but when 
there is a conflict between the protections of those rendering justice and 
those seeking justice, the scales should give way to the seekers.  Surely, a 
litigant’s right to justice is more fundamental than a judicial candidate’s 
right to announce his opinions.  The added hit of Citizens United, and its 
conversion of nonpromissory statements into implied promises, 
unnecessarily harms the independence of our judiciary and renders the 
announce clause necessary. 
The changed circumstances since White—Citizens United—also 
provide an argument under another factor identified by the Casey Court: 
workability.243  When deciding whether to overrule White, the Court 
should “enquire whether [White’s] central rule has been found 
unworkable.”244  The Court has defined workability as an issue of 
“judicial competence.”245  Here, White has required judicial assessment 
of state judicial codes affecting candidates’ ability to make 
nonpromissory campaign statements, and these determinations have not 
incontestably “fall[en] within judicial competence.”246  As discussed 
above, distinguishing between announcements and commitments has 
been an area of grief and disagreement for the courts.247  Now, with the 
added effect of Citizens United’s substantial campaign expenditures 
converting nonpromissory campaign statements into implied promises, 
the line between announcements and commitments will be even more 
difficult for courts to ascertain.  Therefore, the unworkability of White’s 
holding weighs in favor of overruling White. 
Another factor the Casey Court instructs us to consider is whether 
overruling White can be done “without serious inequity to those who 
have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the society 
governed by it.”248  The backbone of this inquiry is whether the White 
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holding “has created substantial investment-backed expectations, such 
that shifting it would feel like Lucy pulling the football away from 
Charlie Brown, once the full force of his leg and body had become 
invested in the legitimate expectation of kicking it.”249 
Here, there is obviously an argument for maintaining White.  
Presumably, both the electorate and judicial candidates have 
understandably come to rely on the ability of candidates to announce 
their views on disputed legal issues.  However, the real argument would 
be whether those expectations are substantially investment-backed.  The 
answer to that question would be difficult to ascertain and vary 
considerably from state to state and election to election. 
Furthermore, the amount of weight that should be given to this factor 
does not seem substantial.  The Court has made it clear that prior 
decisions can be overruled—the law can change—even if doing so 
“disturb[s] the relied-upon expectations of individuals.”250  Concern for 
disrupting expectations cannot control our law-making process.  “The 
simple fact is that legal rules change all the time.  Legislatures are 
constantly creating new legal rules. . . . Only a fool or a sucker—like 
Charlie Brown relying on Lucy—would count on the legal rule 
remaining firmly in place.”251 
Despite the sharp conflict between White and Citizens United, as 
well as the strong arguments weighing in favor of overturning White, 
there are other arguments that cut against overruling White.  The final 
factor that Casey instructs us to consider is “whether the law’s growth in 
the intervening years has left [White’s] central rule a doctrinal 
anachronism discounted by society.”252  This consideration does not 
weigh in favor of overturning White since White’s holding has clearly not 
become a “doctrinal anachronism discounted by society.” 
Furthermore, the current composition of the Court points towards the 
retention of White.  Since Justice Alito’s replacement of Justice 
O’Connor, the Court has “struck down or narrowed campaign regulations 
that the Court ‘clearly would have upheld had O’Connor been on the 
court.’”253  Lastly, the principle of stare decisis is strongly rooted in our 
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judicial system, and the Court rarely overturns itself.254  Therefore, 
overruling White appears an unlikely and unrealistic solution. 
b. Excluding Judicial Elections from Citizens United 
A second—and arguably stronger—solution to Citizens United’s 
negative impact on the judiciary is to exclude judicial elections from the 
application of Citizens United.  The Citizens United majority did not 
discuss the holding’s impact on the judiciary.255  In fact, the majority did 
not mention the judiciary at all in its opinion.256  Furthermore, while 
there is little case law discussing the constitutional protection of 
expenditures specifically in judicial elections, the distinct differences 
between the judiciary and the other branches of government justify 
greater restrictions on spending in the judicial campaign arena. 
First, judges do not fall within the same “representative politics” as 
legislative and executive officials.  Before expanding on this idea, 
however, a discussion about the courts’ role as policymakers is 
necessary.  Although the primary role of the judiciary is to impartially 
decide disputes between parties according to the law, the idea that judges 
merely “find the law” is more of a myth than a reality.  Because the “law 
remains one of the most common means of formalizing public policy,” 
judges are not only impartial arbitrators but policymakers as well.257  
Judges shape and develop the law every time they rule on the meaning of 
a statute. 
But despite the courts’ role as policymakers, the judiciary is 
fundamentally a different kind of policymaker—and therefore a different 
kind of representative—than the legislature.  The distinction between the 
judiciary and other “representative politics” is one that does not go 
unsupported.  As Judge Cardozo once described the policymaking 
difference between the legislature and the judiciary, the judiciary 
“legislates only between the gaps.”258  Dissenting in White, Justice 
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Ginsburg asserted that the difference between the judiciary’s 
representative function and that of other braches of government is rooted 
in the fact that “[e]ven when [judges] develop common law or give 
concrete meaning to constitutional text, judges act only in the context of 
individual cases, the outcome of which cannot depend on the will of the 
public.”259  Therefore, Justice Ginsburg concluded, “[l]egislative and 
executive officials act [as representatives] of the voters who placed them 
in office; ‘judge[s] represen[t] the Law.’”260 
Still, whether the current Court would distinguish the judiciary from 
other “representative politics” is not entirely clear.  In Chisom v. Roemer, 
the Court held that judges were “representatives” within the meaning of 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.261  Justice Stevens—considered by 
many to have been on the liberal side of the Court262—wrote for the 
majority in Chisom and reasoned that the very act of electing judges 
places the judiciary in the same category of “representatives” as the other 
branches of government.263  Then, however, in Stevens’s White dissent, 
he asserted that the judiciary is “fundamentally different from [the office] 
occupied by policymaking officials.”264  Justice Souter joined Justice 
Stevens in both Chisom and White.265 
Conversely, Justice Scalia—who sits on the conservative side of the 
Court—dissented in Chisom, contending “it is the prosecutor who 
represents ‘the People’; the judge represents the Law.”266  Yet writing for 
the majority in White, Scalia asserted that the “separation of the judiciary 
from the enterprise of ‘representative government’” had become greatly 
exaggerated.267  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined 
Justice Scalia in both Chisom and White.268 
Nevertheless, even if the current Court would agree with the Chisom 
majority that judicial elections place the judiciary within the scope of 
“representative politics,” there are still several arguments to be made for 
                                                                                                                       
added). 
 259. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 806 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 260. Id. at 803 (alteration in original) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 411 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 261. See 501 U.S. at 404. 
 262. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 50. 
 263. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 399. 
 264. White, 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 265. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 382; White, 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting). 
 266. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410–11 (Scalia, Rehnquist, & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). 
 267. White, 536 U.S. at 784. 
 268. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404 (Scalia, Rehnquist, & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting); White, 536 U.S. at 
766. 
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excluding judicial elections from Citizens United’s holding.  First, the 
majority’s reasoning in Citizens United is contradictory to the 
characteristics of our impartial judiciary.  The majority reasons that 
“favoritism and influences are not . . . avoidable in representative 
politics” and that just because corporations “have influence over . . . 
elected officials does not mean that those officials are corrupt.”269  Based 
on this reasoning, it is hard to understand Citizens United’s application to 
judicial elections.  The Citizens United majority recognized that a 
consequence of its holding would be corporate influence; however, 
contrary to what the Court stated, an influenced judiciary is a corrupt 
judiciary by definition. 
Secondly, judicial elections already differ from legislative and 
executive elections in ways that have major consequences on spending in 
judicial elections.  For example, “[o]ther elective officials are free to 
seek support by making promises about how they will perform.  Judges 
are not.”270  Additionally, for many years polls have evidenced that 
voters are terrifically uneducated in judicial elections, not knowing even 
the names of “the most visible judicial candidates.”271  Our electorate’s 
lack of education in judicial elections buttresses the fear that “special 
interests,” funded by substantial corporate expenditures, will be deciding 
races.272 
Lastly, courts recognize the view that judicial elections should be 
treated discretely from other elections because of the judiciary’s unique 
characteristics.  For example, the Kansas Supreme Court has recognized 
that “the judicial candidate is forbidden to enter [the] customary 
campaign arena.”273  Even the Supreme Court, in White, made a point to 
clarify that it was not asserting or implying “that the First Amendment 
requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for 
legislative office.”274 
In sum, even though judges are policymakers—and despite the 
assertion made by some that the judiciary falls within the scope of 
“representative politics”—the inherent differences between the judiciary 
                                                     
 269. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 270. Roy A. Schotland, Campaign Finance in Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1489, 
1490 (2001). 
 271. Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 2001 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 849, 855 & n.26. 
 272. See generally Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of 
Three Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 715 (2011) (describing all of the groups that funded the 
campaign against the retention of three Iowa justices). 
 273. In re Baker, 542 P.2d 701, 705 (Kan. 1975). 
 274. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002). 
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and the other branches of government justify excluding judicial elections 
from Citizens United’s holding.  This conclusion would, of course, 
eliminate the concerns for the judiciary’s independence that Citizens 
United has caused. 
c. In the Meantime 
To restore and maintain the impartiality of our judiciary, White and 
Citizens United cannot live together.  If White and Citizens United are 
not separated, either by overturning White or by excluding judicial 
elections from Citizens United’s holding, judicial candidates’ 
nonpromissory campaign statements will be downgraded to promises to 
the “special interests” willing to spend the most.  Still, until the 
severance of White and Citizens United is accomplished—if ever—states 
should protect the impartiality of their judiciaries by increasing their 
recusal standards. 
The facts of Caperton—big money purchasing a particular judge 
and, thus, particular rulings—provide a painfully realistic example of 
what could become of our judiciary.275  Unfortunately, the Caperton 
requirement that judges recuse themselves when a “contributor’s 
influence on the election under all the circumstances” would tempt the 
judge to abandon judicial duties of impartiality276 does not provide 
adequate safeguards against the risks to our judiciary.  In fact, the Court 
emphasized that the facts of Caperton were “extreme” and held that its 
decision only applied to “extraordinary situation[s]” like Caperton.277  
Furthermore, the Court recognized the inadequacy of due process recusal 
standards and noted that state judicial codes provide more protection than 
due process.278 
Therefore, states should begin to battle the breakdown of our 
impartial judiciary through rigorous recusal laws.  For example, the 
ABA’s recusal standard requires judges to recuse themselves when a 
judicial candidate makes a public statement that “appears to commit the 
judge to reach a particular result.”279  Whether substantial expenditures 
                                                     
 275. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 276. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263–64 (2009). 
 277. Id. at 2265. 
 278. Id. at 2265–67. 
 279. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, R. 2.11(A)(5) (2007).  Reform of state 
recusal laws is beyond the scope of this Comment.  For further discussion on the topic, see Jason D. 
Grimes, Note, Aligning Judicial Elections with Our Constitutional Values: The Separation of 
Powers, Judicial Free Speech, and Due Process, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 863, 885 & n.170 (2009). 
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were made by a “special interest”—related to the public statement—
could factor into whether the statement “appeared to commit” the 
candidate.  Yet the strengthening of recusal laws is bound to raise a new 
set of constitutional issues and flaws.  For example, would judicial 
candidates begin to self-censor so much that the recusal laws would 
become restrictive of protected speech?  Thus, although states should 
begin to implement more rigorous recusal standards to protect their 
judiciary, this response will not take away from the pressing need to 
sever White and Citizens United from each other. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The judiciary is far different than any other branch of our 
government.  Our judges are to act as agents of justice, and justice alone.  
Unfortunately, decisions throughout the past decade have defeated 
almost all efforts to ensure the independence of our elected judiciary.  If 
jurisdictions that select judges through elections plan to rebuild and 
maintain an impartial judiciary, the first step is to ensure that special 
interests are not buying up and controlling judges—which is exactly 
what the intersection of White and Citizens United has made possible. 
In striving for an impartial judiciary, White and Citizens United 
cannot live together.  By placing feelings of pressure, indebtedness, fear, 
and dependence into the minds of judicial candidates who were put on 
the bench largely due to substantial campaign expenditures by 
corporations, Citizens United takes what White described as 
nonpromissory campaign statements that are not uniquely destructive of 
impartiality and converts those statements into implied promises—
promises that threaten the litigant’s right to impartial justice.  Therefore, 
something must be done.  The conflict between White and Citizens 
United must be eliminated.  As such, White and Citizens United must be 
severed, either by overruling White or by excluding judicial elections 
from Citizens United’s holding. 
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V. Appendix 
Table 1: States That Regulate Campaign Speech Through Pledges or 
Promises and Commit Clauses 
 
State Pledges or Promises 
Clause 
Commit Clause 
Alabama A judicial candidate “[s]hall 
not make any promise of 
conduct in office other than 
the faithful and impartial 
performance of the duties of 
the office.”  ALA. CANONS 
OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 
7(B)(1)(c). 
 
Alaska A judicial candidate shall not 
“make pledges or promises 
of conduct in judicial office 
other than to faithfully and 
impartially perform the 
duties of the office.”  
ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(i). 
A judicial candidate shall not 
“make statements that 
commit or appear to commit 
the candidate to a particular 
view or decision with respect 
to cases, controversies or 
issues that are likely to come 
before the court.”  ALASKA 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii). 
Arizona A judicial candidate shall not 
“in connection with cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises, or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of 
judicial office.”  ARIZ. SUP. 
CT. R. 81, Canon 4, R. 
4.1(A)(10). 
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State Pledges or Promises 
Clause 
Commit Clause 
Arkansas A judicial candidate shall not 
“in connection with cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises, or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of 
judicial office.”  ARK. CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 4, R.  4.1(A)(13). 
 
California  A judicial candidate shall not 
“make statements to the 
electorate . . . that commit 
the candidate with respect to 
cases, controversies, or 
issues that could come 
before the courts.”  CAL. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 
Canon 5(B)(1). 
Colorado A judicial candidate shall not 
“in connection with cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises, or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of 
judicial office.”  COLO. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 4, R. 4.1(A)(13). 
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State Pledges or Promises 
Clause 
Commit Clause 
Florida A judicial candidate shall not 
“with respect to parties or 
classes of parties, cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises, or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the 
office.”  FLA. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
7(A)(3)(e)(i). 
 
Georgia  A judicial candidate “shall 
not make statements that 
commit the candidate with 
respect to issues likely to 
come before the court.”  GA. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 7(B)(1)(b). 
Hawaii A judicial candidate shall not 
“in connection with cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises, or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of 
judicial office.”  HAW. REV. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 4, R. 4.1(a)(13). 
 
Idaho A judicial candidate shall not 
“make pledges or promises 
of conduct in office other 
than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the 
duties of the office.”  IDAHO 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(A)(4)(d)(i). 
A judicial candidate shall not 
“make statements that 
commit or appear to commit 
the candidate with respect to 
cases, controversies or issues 
that are likely to come before 
the court.”  IDAHO CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(4)(d)(ii). 
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State Pledges or Promises 
Clause 
Commit Clause 
Illinois  A judicial candidate shall not 
“make statements that 
commit or appear to commit 
the candidate with respect to 
cases, controversies or issues 
within cases that are likely to 
come before the court.”  ILL. 
SUP. CT. R. 67, Canon 
7(A)(3)(d)(i). 
Indiana A judicial candidate shall not 
“in connection with cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises, or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of 
judicial office.”  IND. CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 4, R. 4.1(A)(13). 
 
Iowa A judicial candidate shall not 
“in connection with cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises, or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of 
judicial office.”  IOWA CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 
51:4.1 (A)(13). 
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State Pledges or Promises 
Clause 
Commit Clause 
Kansas A judicial candidate shall not 
“in connection with cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises, or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of 
judicial office.”  KAN. SUP. 
CT. R. 601B, Canon 4, R. 
4.1(A)(6). 
 
Louisiana A judicial candidate shall not 
“with respect to cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the 
office.”  LA. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
7(B)(1)(d)(i). 
 
Maine A judicial candidate shall not 
“make pledges or promises 
of conduct in office other 
than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the 
duties of the office.”  ME. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT  
Canon 5(B)(2)(a). 
A judicial candidate shall not 
“make statements that 
commit or appear to commit 
the candidate with respect to 
cases, controversies, or 
issues that are likely to come 
before the court.”  ME. CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(B)(2)(b). 
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State Pledges or Promises 
Clause 
Commit Clause 
Maryland A judicial candidate “with 
respect to a case, 
controversy, or issue that is 
likely to come before the 
court, shall not make a 
commitment, pledge, or 
promise that is inconsistent 
with the impartial 
performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the 
office.”  MD. RULES R. 16-
813, § 4, R. 4.4(d)(3). 
 
Michigan A judicial candidate “should 
not make pledges or 
promises of conduct in office 
other than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the 
duties of the office.”  MICH. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 7(B)(1)(c). 
 
Minnesota A judicial candidate shall not 
“in connection with cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises, or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of 
judicial office.”  MINN. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 4, R. 4.1(A)(11). 
 
Mississippi A judicial candidate shall not 
“make pledges or promises 
of conduct in office other 
than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the 
duties of the office.”  MISS. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i).  
A judicial candidate shall not 
“make statements that 
commit or appear to commit 
the candidate with respect to 
cases, controversies or issues 
that are likely to come before 
the court.”  MISS. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(ii). 
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State Pledges or Promises 
Clause 
Commit Clause 
Missouri A judicial candidate “shall 
not make pledges or 
promises of conduct in office 
other than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the 
duties of the office.”  MO. 
SUP. CT. R. 2.03, Canon 
5(B)(1)(c). 
 
Montana A judicial candidate shall not 
“in connection with cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises, or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of 
judicial office.”  MONT. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 4, R. 4.1(A)(12). 
 
Nebraska A judicial candidate shall not 
“make pledges or promises 
of conduct in office other 
than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the 
duties of the office.”  NEB. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
§ 5-205, Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(i). 
A judicial candidate shall not 
“make statements that 
commit or appear to commit 
the candidate with respect to 
cases, controversies, or 
issues that are likely to come 
before the court.”  NEB. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
§ 5-205, Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(ii). 
Nevada A judicial candidate shall not 
“with respect to cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the 
office.”  NEV. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, 
R. 4.1(A)(13). 
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A judicial candidate shall not 
“with respect to cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the 
office.”  N.H. SUP. CT. R. 38, 
Canon 5(B)(1)(b)(i). 
 
New Mexico A judicial candidate shall not 
“with respect to cases, 
controversies or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the 
office.”  N.M. SUP. CT. R. 
21-700(B)(4)(a). 
 
New York A judicial candidate shall not 
“make pledges or promises 
of conduct in office that are 
inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the 
office.”  N.Y. CT. R.  
§ 100.5(A)(4)(d)(i). 
A judicial candidate shall not 
“with respect to cases, 
controversies or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the 
office.”  N.Y. CT. R.  
§ 100.5(A)(4)(d)(ii).  
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A judicial candidate shall not 
“with respect to cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the 
office.”  N.D. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(i). 
 
Ohio A judicial candidate shall not 
“[i]n connection with cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises, or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of 
judicial office.”  OHIO CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 4, R. 4.1(A)(7). 
 
Oklahoma A judicial candidate shall 
not, “in connection with 
cases, controversies, or 
issues that are likely to come 
before the court, make 
pledges, promises, or 
commitments that are 
inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of 
judicial office.”  OKLA. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 4, R. 4.1(A)(13). 
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State Pledges or Promises 
Clause 
Commit Clause 
Oregon A judicial candidate shall not 
“[m]ake pledges or promises 
of conduct in office that 
could inhibit or compromise 
the faithful, impartial and 
diligent performance of the 
duties of the office.”  OR. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
JUD. R. 4-102(B). 
 
 
Pennsylvania A judicial candidate “should 
not make pledges or 
promises of conduct in office 
other than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the 
duties of the office.”  PA. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 7(B)(1)(c). 
A judicial candidate should 
not “make statements that 
commit the candidate with 
respect to cases, 
controversies or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court.”  PA. CODE OF 




A judicial candidate shall not 
“make pledges or promises 
of conduct in office other 
than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the 
duties of the office.”  R.I. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i). 
A judicial candidate shall not 
“make statements that 
commit or appear to commit 
the candidate with respect to 
cases, controversies or issues 
that are likely to come before 
the court.”  R.I. CODE OF 




A judicial candidate shall not 
“make pledges or promises 
of conduct in office other 
than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the 
duties of the office.”  S.C. 
APP. CT. R. 501, Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(i). 
A judicial candidate shall not 
“make statements that 
commit or appear to commit 
the candidate with respect to 
cases, controversies or issues 
that are likely to come before 
the court.”  S.C. APP. CT. R. 
501, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii). 
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A judicial candidate shall not 
“with respect to cases, 
controversies, or issues that 
are likely to come before the 
court, make pledges, 
promises or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the 
office.”  S.D. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(i). 
 
Tennessee A judicial candidate shall not 
“make pledges or promises 
of conduct in office other 
than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the 
duties of the office.”  TENN. 
SUP. CT. R. 10, Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(i). 
A judicial candidate shall not 
“make statements that 
commit or appear to commit 
the candidate with respect to 
cases, controversies, or 
issues that are likely to come 
before the court.”  TENN. 
SUP. CT. R. 10, Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(ii). 
Texas A judicial candidate shall not 
“make pledges or promises 
of conduct in office 
regarding pending or 
impending cases, specific 
classes of cases, specific 
classes of litigants, or 
specific propositions of law 
that would suggest to a 
reasonable person that the 
judge is predisposed to a 
probable decision in cases 
within the scope of the 
pledge.”  TEX. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(1)(i). 
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State Pledges or Promises 
Clause 
Commit Clause 
Utah A judicial candidate shall not 
“make pledges, promises, or 
commitments other than the 
faithful, impartial and 
diligent performance of 
judicial duties.”  UTAH CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 4, R. 4.1(A)(11). 
 
Vermont A judicial candidate shall not 
“make pledges or promises 
of judicial conduct other 
than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the 
duties of the office.”  VT. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(B)(4)(a). 
A judicial candidate shall not 
“make statements that 
commit or appear to commit 
the candidate with respect to 
cases, controversies, or 
issues that are likely to come 
before the court.”  VT. CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(B)(4)(b). 
Washington A judicial candidate shall 
not, “in connection with 
cases, controversies, or 
issues that are likely to come 
before the court, make 
pledges, promises, or 
commitments that are 
inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of 
judicial office.”  WASH. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 




A judicial candidate shall not 
“make pledges or promises 
of conduct in office other 
than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the 
duties of the office.”  W. VA. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i). 
A judicial candidate shall not 
“make statements that 
commit or appear to commit 
the candidate with respect to 
cases, controversies or issues 
that are likely to come before 
the court.”  W. VA. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(ii). 
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State Pledges or Promises 
Clause 
Commit Clause 
Wisconsin A judicial candidate shall not 
“make . . . with respect to 
cases, controversies, or 
issues that are likely to come 
before the court, pledges, 
promises, or commitments 
that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the 
office.”  WIS. SUP. CT. R. 
60.06(3)(b). 
 
Wyoming A judicial candidate shall 
“not make pledges or 
promises of conduct in office 
other than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the 
duties of the office; [nor] 
announce how the judge 
would rule on any case or 
issue that might come before 
the judge.”  WYO. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, 
R. 4.2(A)(5). 
 
 
